


















So you are making money in financial markets. Should you tell your friends how?
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Constant price impact functions widely used in financial modelling strongly advise in favour
of letting trusted friends exploit one’s own arbitrage opportunities because they prevent correct
arbitrage removal. Starting from the example of chain arbitrage exploitation, a consistency criterion
is proposed. It is only fulfilled by non-constant impact functions. The role of the feedback of
sequential market orders of the same kind on the order book is crucial for ensuring consistency at
the smallest time scale.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are several starting points for studying financial
market dynamics theoretically. The most widely used
is to assume that the actions of all traders and exter-
nal news result collectively into so large fluctuations that
any predictability pattern is neither detectable nor ex-
ploitable. This view, dating back at least to Bachelier [1],
is the basis of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
[2] and is very convenient for elaborating option pric-
ing theories [3]. Behavioural finance starts from EMH
and incorporates deviations from rational expectations
in the behaviour of the agents in an attempt to explain
anomalous properties of financial markets (see [4] for a
recent review). Another approach is to inject a contro-
lable amount of predictability and study how the traders
exploit and remove it in order to understand what the
dynamical road to efficiency is [5, 6].
Even the champions of EMH agree that there are tem-
porary anomalies, due for instance to uninformed traders
(sometimes called noise traders), that arbitrageurs tend
to cancel. Thus the random walk hypothesis must be
viewed as an extreme assumption describing an average
idealised behaviour that does not describe every detail of
the microscopic price dynamics. And indeed extreme as-
sumptions are most useful in any theoretical framework.
This is why the opposite assumption is worth considering:
the discussion will start by focusing on a single transac-
tion and investigates how to exploit perfect knowledge
about it. Trader 0 is active at time t; he buys/sells a
given amount of shares n0, leading to (log-)price change
r(t) = r0, where t is in transaction time, t being the t-th
transaction. Even more, one also assumes that trader 1
has perfect information about t and r0. What the latter
must do in order to exploit his piece of information is
clear.
A related discussion is found in Ref. [7] which discusses
(among other topics) the exploitation of an isolated pat-
tern; its main result is that the pattern does not dis-
appear; on the contrary, its very exploitation spreads it
around t. Therefore, this work raises the question of
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how microscopic arbitrage removal is possible at all. In
addition, since the arbitrage is still present, it is still ex-
ploitable.
This paper aims at answering these two questions. It
shows first the need to change the way price impact and
speculation is incorporated in financial literature. Indeed
its immense majority relies on two fundamental assump-
tions: first constant and often symmetric price impact
functions. The second point is how arbitrage is removed.
Current literature often restricts its attention to single-
time price returns, without taking into account the fact
that speculation is inherently inter-temporal. This is sim-
pler but wrong. Indeed, one does not make money by the
transactions themselves, but by holding a position, that
is, by doing nothing.
Both assumptions are useful simplifications that made
possible some understanding of the dynamics of market
models. However, since the discussion on arbitrage in
market models is generally in discrete time, one could
in principle argue that one time step is long enough to
include holding periods, but this is inconsistent with the
nature of most financial markets. Indeed, the buy/sell
orders arrive usually asynchronously in continuous time,
which rules out the possibility of synchronous trading; at
a larger time scale, the presence of widely different time
scales also rules out perfect synchronicity.
Once arbitrage exploitation is considered at its most
minute temporal level, that is, when its ineluctable inter-
temporality is respected, a simple consistency criterion
for price impact functions emerges. If violated, a para-
doxical arbitrage chain exploitation is possible, or equiva-
lently, the gain of a money-making trader is not decreased
if he informs his trusted friends of the existence of arbi-
trage opportunities. As we shall see, the dynamics of
price impact functions is a key element of their consis-
tency.
By focusing on the exploitation a single transaction iso-
lated in time, and by assuming that trader 1 experiences
no difficulty in injecting his transactions just before and
after t, his risk profiles with respect to price fluctuations
and uncertain position holding period are irrelevant and
will be neglected.
2II. THE PARADOX
The price impact function I(n) is by definition the rel-
ative price change caused by a transaction of n (integer)
shares (n > 0 for buying, n < 0 for selling); mathemati-
cally,
p(t+ 1) = p(t) + I(n), (1)
where p(t) is the log-price and t is in transaction time.
The above notation misleadingly suggests that I does not
depend on time. In reality, not only I is subject to ran-
dom fluctuations (which will be neglected here), but also,
for instance, to strong feed-back from the type of market
orders which has a long memory (see e.g. [8, 9, 10] for dis-
cussions about the dynamical nature of market impact).
Neglecting the dynamics of I requires us to consider spe-
cific shapes for I that enforce some properties of price
impact for each transaction, whereas in reality they only
hold on average. For example, one should restrict one-
self to the class of functions that makes it impossible to
obtain round-trip positive gains [7]. But the inappropri-
ateness of constant price impact functions is all the more
obvious as soon as one considers how price predictabil-
ity is removed by speculation, which is inter-temporal by
nature.
The most intuitive (but wrong) view of market ineffi-
ciency is to regard price predictability as a scalar devia-
tion from the unpredictable case: if there were a relative
price deviation r0 caused by a transaction of n0 shares at
some time t, according to this view, one should exchange
n1 shares so as to cancel perfectly this anomaly, where
n1 is such that I(n1) = −r0. This view amounts to re-
garding predictability as something that can be remedied
with a single trade. However, the people that would try
and cancel r0 would not gain anything by doing it unless
they are market makers who try to stabilise the price.
The speculators on the other hand make money by open-
ing, holding, and closing positions. Hence one needs to
understand the mechanisms of arbitrage removal by the
speculators.
Trader 1, a perfectly (and possibly illegally) informed
speculator, will take advantage of his knowledge by open-
ing a position at time t − 1 and closing it at time t + 1.
It is important to be aware that if one places an order
at time t, the transaction takes place at price p(t + 1).
Provided that trader 0 buys/sells n0 shares irrespective
of the price that he obtains, the round-trip of trader 1
yields a monetary gain of
g1 = n1[e
p(t+2) − ep(t)] = n1e
p0 [eI(n0) − eI(n1)]. (2)





= eI(n0)−I(n1) − 1, (3)
where p0 is the log-price before any trader considered here
makes a transaction. Since I(n) generally increases with
n, there is an optimal n∗1 number of shares that max-
imises g1. The discussion so far is a simplification, in
real-money instead of log-money space, of the one found
in Ref. [7]. One should note that far from diminishing
price predictability, the intervention of trader 1 increases
the fluctuations. Therefore, in the framework of constant
price impact functions, an isolated arbitrage opportunity
never vanishes but becomes less and less exploitable be-
cause of the fluctuations, thus the reduction, of signal-
to-noise ratio caused by the speculators.
It seems that trader 1 cannot achieve a better gain
than by holding n∗1 shares at time t. Since the actions of
trader 1 do not modify in any way the arbitrage opportu-
nity between t−2 and t+2, he can inform a fully trusted
friend, trader 2, of the gain opportunity on the condition
that the latter opens his position before t− 1 and closes
it after t + 1 so as to avoid modifying the relative gain
of trader 1.[18] For instance, trader 2 informs trader 1
when he has opened his position and trader 1 tells trader
2 when he has closed his position. From the point of view
of trader 2, this is very reasonable because the resulting
action of trader 1 is to leave the arbitrage opportunity
unchanged to r0 since p(t+ 1)− p(t− 1) = r0. Trader 2
will consequently buy n∗2 = n
∗
1 shares at time t−2 and sell
them at time t+ 2, earning the same return as trader 1.
This can go on until trader i has no fully trusted friend.
Note that the advantage of trader 1 is that he holds a
position over a smaller time interval, thereby increasing
his return rate; in addition, since trader 2 increases the
opening price of trader 1, which results into a prefactor
eI(n2) in Eq. (9), the absolute monetary gain of trader 1
actually increases provided that he has enough capital to
invest. Before explaining why this situation is paradoxi-
cal, it makes sense to emphasise that the gains of traders
i > 0 are of course obtained at the expense of trader 0,
and that the result the particular order of the traders’
actions is to create a bubble which peaks at time t+ 1.
The paradox is the following: if trader 1 is alone, the
best return that can be extracted from his perfect knowl-
edge is gˆ1(n
∗
1) according to the above reasoning. When
there are N traders in the ring of trust, the total return
extracted is N times the optimal gain of a single trader.
Now, assume that trader 1 has two brokering accounts;
he can use each of his accounts, respecting the order in
which to open and close his positions, effectively earning
the optimal return on each of his accounts. The para-
dox is that his actions would be completely equivalent
to investing n∗1 and then n
∗
1 from the same account. In
particular, in the case of I(n) = n, this seems a priori ex-
actly similar to grouping the two transactions into 2n∗1,
but this results of course in a return smaller than the
optimal return for a doubled investment. Hence, in this
framework, trader 1 can earn as much as pleases provided
that he splits his investment into sub-parts of n∗1 shares
whatever I is, as long as it is constant.
Two criticisms can be raised. First, the ring of trust
3must be perfect for this scheme to work, otherwise a Pris-
oner’s dilemma arises, as it is advantageous for trader i+1
to defect and close his position before trader i. In that
case, the expected return for each trader is of order 1/N ,
as in Ref [7].
But more importantly, one may expect that the above
discussion relies crucially on the fact that r0 does not
depend on the actual price, or equivalently that trader
0 wishes to buy or to sell a predetermined number of
shares. As we shall see in the second part of this paper,
the paradox still exists even if trader 0 has a fixed budget
C (which is more likely to arise if trader 0 intends to buy).
But this paradox seems too good to be present in real
markets. As a consequence, one should rather consider
its impossibility as an a contrario consistency criterion
for price impact functions. The final part of this paper
explores the dynamics of price impact functions.
III. FINITE CAPITAL
When trader 0 has a finite capital, the number of shares
that he can buy decreases when traders 1, 2, . . . increase
the share price before his transaction. Let us assume
that trader 0 has capital C that buys n0 shares at price
ep0 . The price he obtains is different from ep0 because of
his impact: the real quantity of shares that C can buy is









We shall first focus on the case where the self impact is
neglected, or equivalently where trader 0 has a restricted
budget with flexible constraint since it is leads to simpler
mathematical expressions.








I(n1)) − eI(n1)]. (5)
It is easy to convince oneself that there is always an
n∗1 provided that n0 is large enough. Trader 1 must now
be careful when communicating the existence of the ar-
bitrage to trader 2, since the latter decreases the price
return caused by trader 0. Indeed, assuming that trader

















which must be compensated for by trader 2. Without






)+I(n2)) − eI(n2)]. (7)
The case where trader 0 has a strict budget constraint is
obtained by replacing n0 by n
(0)
0 in Eqs (5), (6) and (7).
The paradox exists if trader 2 has a positive total gain,
i.e., G2 = g2 − ∆g1 > 0. In order to investigate when
this is the case, one must resort to particular examples
of price impact functions.
Empirical research showed that I is a non-linear, con-
cave function [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Although there is
no consensus on its shape, logarithms and power- laws
are possible candidates. From a mathematical point of
view, logarithmic functions allow for explicit computa-
tions, while power-laws must be investigated numerically.
A. Log price impact functions
The generic impact function that will be studied is
I(|x|) = γ log |λx|; when λ > 1, a transaction of one
share results in a price change; the number of shares will
be rescaled so as to contain λ, which shorten the math-
ematical expressions. The parameter γ < 1 is related to
the liquidity and brings down the impact to reasonable
levels: if λx = 100 and γ = 0.01, the price is increased
by about 5%.
For the sake of comparison, we address the case of
infinite capital: by differentiating Eq (5) with respect to





which simplifies to n0/2 if γ = 1. The optimal monetary






In the case of finite capital, the optimal number of















which is linear in n0, in contrast to its super-linearity in
Eq (9): the limited budget of trader 0 helps to remove
predictability.
The gain of trader 1 in the presence of trader 2 is
g1,2(n
∗











































FIG. 1: Region where the paradox exists (scaled n∗2 > 1) in
parameter space (n0, γ). Logarithmic impact, finite capital


















with respect to n2. The paradox survives in the regions of
the parameter space such that G2 > 0
∗ and n∗2 > 1. Nu-
merical investigations show that G∗2 > 0 is always true.
From Fig. 1 one sees that the paradox exists provided
that scaled n0 is large enough (λn0 > e
1+γ/2 for γ ≪ 1)
and γ small enough, which is compatible with realistic
values. Note that g∗1 and G
∗
2 are increasing functions of






If trader 0 has a strict budget, the number of shares










0 ; after trader 1 has opened his

























hence the number of shares to invest is lowered further
in comparison with Eq (10). All the expressions of the
respective gains of trader 1 and 2 do not simplify to neat
and short expressions and no analytical solution to the
maximisation of G2 can be found. Numerical maximi-














FIG. 2: Region where the optimal gain of trader 2 is positive
in the (scaled) n0, β space. Power-law impact function and
finite capital.
strict constraint increases the minimum n0 needed for
making the paradox possible when γ is small enough. At
γ ≃ 0.66, the boundary lines cross; this may be due to
the fact that trader 2 must pay a smaller compensation
to trader 1 when γ increases.
B. Power-law impact functions
Several papers suggest a power-law price impact func-
tion I(|x|) = |x/λ|β with λ ≥ 1 and β ∈ [0.4, 0.8]
[13, 15, 16]. With this choice of functions, it is not pos-
sible to maximise explicitly g1 and G2.
Performing all the maximisations of the finite capital
case numerically, one finds that the picture of the log
impact function is still valid in this case (see Fig. 2), in
particular for I(x) ∝ x. Interestingly, this is the most
common choice in the literature on agent-based models,
option pricing, etc. It was derived analytically by Kyle
[17] under the assumption of linearity between private in-
formation and insiders’ order flow. More recently, Farmer
[7] uses it as simple example of a function that prevents
making trading profits from a round trip. And certainly,
it may seem the least arbitrary, since it does not seem
to impose any particular choice of β. Hence constant
I(x) ∝ x is to be banished. But power-laws are inconsis-
tent for all possible real-market values of β; once again,
this shows that constant price impact functions are to be
avoided.
IV. FEEDBACK
The only sure way out from inconsistent price impact
functions is to take into account the dynamics of the
order book, particularly the reaction of the order book
5to a sequence of market orders of the same kind. There is
a consensus that the impact of a second order is smaller
than that of the first one of the same kind and size [8, 9];
mathematically, I(n, t) + I(n, t+ 1) < 2I(n, t).
For example, a recent dynamical theory of market im-
pact [8] states that the impact of a trader is not only




2)β/2 where ∆t is the time (in number of
transactions) since the transaction. To be more pre-
cise, the impact due to a single trade of volume n ∆t
time steps after the transaction is sgn(n) ln(|n|)G0(∆t)+
ξ(∆t), where ξ(∆t) is a white noise term with variance
proportional to ∆t and G0(x) is a monotonically de-
creasing function. Therefore, the average total impact
of two consecutive trades of the same kind volume is
lnn[G0(0) + G0(1)] < 2 lnnG0(0) (the reader is referred
to Ref. [8] for more details); the important point is that
G0 is slowly decreasing, almost constant for small argu-
ments, suggesting a value of relative impact of two con-
secutive trades of the same type, denoted by κ which
depends on the stock considered, but always very close
to 1.
Therefore, for our purpose, we shall assume that a sec-
ond market order of the same size and type has an impact
described by Iκ(n) = κI(n) with 0 < κ < 1, the third
Iκ2(n) = κ
2I(n), etc., and that consecutive market orders
on one side do not influence the price impact function of
the other side.
This assumption is also supported by an other empir-
ical work on the long memory of market order signs [9].
Whatever the precise shape of price impact, Fig. 12 of
this work is strikingly compatible with the assumption
that the whole price impact function is multiplied by a
given constant after each successive market order of the
same kind, hence, can be used to measure κ: this figure
plots the average cumulated price impact of two market
orders of the same type, with volume n1 and n2 respec-




where P (n2|n1) is the probability that the size of the sec-
ond market order is n2 given the fact that the size of the
first one was n1. The important difference from our case
is that the two orders need not be placed immediately
one after the other; therefore, the value of κ that can be
estimated from this figure is a lower bound with respect
to the ideal situation considered here. Assuming that
most of the consecutive market orders of the same kind
come from a large order that has been split, which is be-
lieved to be the cause of the long memory of the market
order signs [9], it also makes sense to suppose that their
sizes are comparable; pushing this line of thought to its
extreme, one approximates P (n2|n1) ≃ δ(n2 − n1), and
obtains finally from the aforenamed figure
I(n2|n1) ≃ Iκ(n2) ≃ (0.14± 0.04)I(n2), (18)
that is, κ = 0.14± 0.04.[19] Similarly, one checks that a
third order also multiplies Iκ by κ = 0.09 ± 0.02. Since
the values of these averages are not statistically different,
we shall assume that κ ≃ 0.12. We note that κ seems to
decrease for each subsequent market order of the same
kind in Fig. 12 of Ref. [9].
When writing the gains of trader 1 and 2, one must be
very careful with the order of the transactions. Starting
with the case of infinite capital of trader 0, the gain of
trader 1 is
g1 = n1[e
I(n1)+Iκ(n0)−I(n1) − eI(n1)], (19)
which makes it clear that there is still a non-zero optimal






















In the case of log price impact functions, the optimal













These two equations already show that the reaction of the
limit order book reduces the gain opportunity of player 1.
Adding trader 2 will reduce further the impact of trader
0, hence the gain of trader 1, and, as before, trader 2



















0 (γ + 1)− 1], (24)

















Trader 1’s impact functions are Iκ when he opens his
position and I when he closes it, which is an additional
cause of loss for trader 1, which must be also compen-
sated for by trader 2. Fortunately for the latter, his im-
pact functions are I when opening and Iκ when closing
his position. Therefore, provided that κ is large enough
so as not to make Iκ2(n0) too small, trader 2 can earn
more than trader 1 in some circumstances.
As above, impact functions are inconsistent whenG∗2 >
0, n∗1 > 1 and n
∗
2 > 1 for log impact functions. It turns














FIG. 3: Regions in which the optimal gain of trader 2 is
positive and in which the number of shares invested by trader
1 is larger than 1. Logarithmic impact, infinite capital, and














κ = 0.83 
FIG. 4: Regions of parameter space where G∗2 > 0 (above the
respective line). Power-law impact functions, feedback with
infinite capital. From top to bottom κ = 0.75, 0.78, 0.8 and
0.83.
out that the regions in which G∗2 > 0 while n
∗
1 > 1 are
disjoint if κ is small enough, which occur at κ slightly
larger than 0.5 with log impact functions (Fig. 3).
The case of power-law impact functions is different,
since G∗2 > 0 and n
∗
2 > 0 are sufficient conditions for
inconsistent impact functions. When κ, is small enough,
G∗2 > 0 becomes impossible (Fig. 4).
The values of critical κ stand between the ones re-
ported by the empirical studies previously mentioned
[8, 9]. The values of κ they report or imply are completely
different from each other, and so are their fundamental
assumptions. However our assumption that the feedback
consists in multiplying the whole impact function by a
constant is compatible with the two of them. Regarding
the dynamical theory of Ref. [8], we note that assuming
that the reaction of the order book to limit order markets
is not a purely white noise, but anticorrelated to the sign
of the market orders would decrease the effective value of
κ; therefore, this work gives an upper bound for κ in our
case. On the other hand, Ref. [9] reports the total price
impact of two consecutive market orders irrespective of
the time that separates them; this is not equivalent to our
assumption of market orders in quick succession. There-
fore, the value of κ given by this work is a lower bound
for the case presented here. We argue therefore that in
the situation considered in this paper, real-market κ is
probably close to its critical value.
We emphasise that it is the feedback that, when large
enough, makes impact functions consistent. Current lit-
erature on limit order price impact functions does make
it possible to be conclusive about the consistency of real
markets price impact functions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Financial markets may ensure consistent market price
impact functions at the most microscopic dynamical level
by the dynamics of the impact function. The paradox
proposed in this paper provides a simple and necessary
condition of consistency for price impact functions, and
shows the need to stop approximating them with con-
stant linear functions in financial literature. As soon as
a strong enough feedback is present, the paradox does not
exist, even with linear price impact functions. As a con-
sequence, one may still use such functions for discussing
market efficiency, but they should not be constant.
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